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304 Abstract
The aim of this paper is to analyze the performance and efficiency of the VAT sys-
tem in B&H and explore the effects of internal and external factors influencing 
VAT collection. The VAT system in B&H is a consumption-type, single-rate and 
broad-based system. Ever since its implementation, VAT collection in B&H has 
been subject to strong oscillations, from an extremely high performance in the first 
two years after the introduction, to a sharp drop at the beginning of the crisis. 
After a temporary recovery, VAT collection declined in the last quarter of 2012 
and has been negative ever since, although a weak recovery of the B&H economy 
was observed in 2013. The key hypothesis is that the high efficiency of the broad-
based and single-rate structured VAT system may be neutralized by the country’s 
specific circumstances and VAT policy design. Applying a set of indicators for VAT 
efficiency analysis, developed by IMF, OECD and EU, we find a deterioration of 
the components of the policy gap caused by derogations of the VAT Law, and an 
increasing compliance gap, due to an increase of the VAT debt and tax evasion, in 
consequence of poor policy design in the field of excises. As a result of the influ-
ence of the country’s specific circumstances and its VAT policy design the identifi-
able current net losses on VAT in 2013 amount to 4% of net VAT collection or 
0.4% of GDP. The analysis presented in the paper proves the main hypothesis that 
a VAT design, even when it is close to theoretically ideal concept, cannot on its 
own produce a high level of VAT efficiency and performance.
Keywords: value-added tax, VAT efficiency
1 INTRODUCTION
Tax systems are expected to be effective, equitable and easy to administer both for 
taxpayers and for tax administrations. The rapid global expansion of value added 
tax (VAT) in over 150 countries is the result of its neutrality in decisions of eco-
nomic agents, the collection efficiency and easiness in collection for taxpayers 
and tax administrations (IBFD, 2014). In the tax structures of modern countries, 
VAT has an important place, and in developing countries, such as Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (B&H), due to the low level of economic development, it represents 
a dominant source of budgetary revenues. 
B&H relatively recently (2006) introduced VAT as part of a comprehensive re-
form of the indirect taxation system. The VAT system in B&H is of a consumption 
type and invoice-credit method. The system is based on the standard rate, a rela-
tively high threshold for registration and an extent of exemptions complying with 
the Council Directive 2006/112/EC (“Directive”). In addition to strong revenue 
growth and reduction of the grey economy the introduction of VAT has contrib-
uted to the internal market integration and adjustment of fiscal architecture in the 
direction of the European integration requirements. However, due to the fulfill-
ment of international obligations of the EU and international financial institutions 
the VAT Law was rapidly weakened by an expansion of the scope of exemptions 
and the introduction of a zero rate in domestic trade of goods and services, indi-d
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305 rectly through VAT refunds on international projects. At the time of implementa-
tion of VAT, B&H began the process of liberalization of foreign trade with neigh-
boring countries and the EU, as well as the process of harmonization of excise 
duties with EU standards. Despite the modest economic growth in the last two 
years, VAT collection has been burdened by increasing refunds and debts to such 
extent that 2013 ended with a drop in revenue from VAT of 1.9%.
The paper aims to investigate, through empirical research and comparative analy-
sis of the efficiency of the VAT system in B&H, the influence of special circum-
stances regarding derogations from the VAT system, the development of the B&H 
economy and its integration into regional and global processes on deviations on 
actual payment in relation to the potential effects of a desirable VAT system. A 
review of relevant literature, international methodologies and analytical tools de-
veloped for VAT efficiency analysis is given in part two. Part three shows the basic 
characteristics of the VAT system in B&H and derogations from it. Part four gives 
an analysis of trends in revenue collection from VAT for a period of introduction 
(2006) to the end of 2013. In part five the analysis focuses on the impact of design 
elements of the VAT system on the efficiency of VAT collection, and in part six on 
the scale of implications of the most important external reforms and processes on 
the VAT base and revenue collection. Part seven presents an analysis of the effi-
ciency of the VAT system in B&H, according to international standards of VAT 
efficiency developed by the OECD, IMF and EU. The research in this paper is 
aimed at confirming the hypothesis that the expected high efficiency of a VAT 
system with a wide base and a single rate can nevertheless be reduced or even 
neutralized by special circumstances, policies and processes related to a particular 
country. 
2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND METHODOLOGY 
2.1 RELEVANT LITERATURE
Although VAT is considered to be the most successful fiscal innovation in the 
second half of the 20th century, Bird concludes that in practice not even one VAT 
system is as good as it could be because the scope of the application (base) is 
lower, the rate structure is below optimal and the administration is below perfect 
efficiency (IFS, 2010a). Facing a dilemma between the principle of efficiency 
(buoyancy) and equity a large number of countries decided for a trade-off, to sac-
rifice the high efficiency of the VAT system with a single rate for the benefit of the 
potential redistributive effects of a VAT system with more rates. According to the 
OECD (2010) the introduction of differentiated VAT rates in developing countries 
could be justified for redistributive reasons, since developing countries have fe- 
wer budgetary instruments for targeted transfers. However, on the other hand, tax 
administrations in these countries do not have sufficient capacity effectively to 
administer multiple rates or to fight the frauds that may arise. 
The Copenhagen Economics study (2007) on the functioning of the VAT system 
in the EU member states has shown that due to the system of differentiated rates d
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306 the total system in the EU suffers from large fiscal and economic losses. The study 
recommends a VAT model with a single VAT rate as far the best policy option of 
VAT taxation from an economic point of view that could provide significant com-
pliance savings to companies and tax administrations, reduce deviations in the 
functioning of the internal market and enhance consumers’ welfare. Empirical 
studies of the IMF (2010), Crawford, Keen and Smith (IFS, 2010a) and IFS (2011) 
showed that differentiated rates in developed and emerging economies are an inef-
ficient means of redistributing income to the poor, since the rich in an absolute 
amounts spend more on items taxed at lower rates than the poor. The IFS study on 
the design of the tax system in Great Britain concludes that benefits of the VAT 
system with a single rate in terms of easy administration outweigh the possible 
benefits of differentiated rates. The study recommends the removal of zero and 
reduced rates and, if possible, exemptions, with the introduction of a comprehen-
sive package to compensate for the poorer members of society (2010b). 
Strategic documents of the EU produced in order to create an appropriate environ-
ment for business, point to the need to ensure the neutrality of VAT, spread the 
base (reducing derogations, exemptions and scope of reduced rates), simplify ad-
ministration and reduce compliance costs (EC, 2010a). Not only do exemptions 
undermine the logic of VAT (IMF, 2010) but Crawford, Keen and Smith (IFS, 
2010a) stress that they create inefficiencies of an unknown magnitude. Strategic 
documents on the development of the VAT system in the EU, starting with the 
negative consequences of exemptions on VAT system neutrality, decisions on in-
vestments and consumption (EU, 2010b), indicate the need to revise the rules of 
exemptions and narrow their scope. However, although VAT collection in member 
states is far below what could be achieved if the standard rate were applied across 
the board, because of the existing exemptions, zero and reduced rates, recent anal-
yses have shown that the majority of member states decided to increase the stand-
ard rate, while only five of them have adopted measures to spread the VAT base 
(Garnier, 2013). The results of one survey (CASE, 2013) suggest there is an in-
creasing gap between potential VAT revenues and collected revenues in relation to 
the findings from the Reckon study (2009). It can be concluded that the current 
policy of increasing the standard rate of VAT in the EU member states, without 
expansion of the base, and with the existing rate structure, would jeopardize the 
efficiency of VAT collection in the EU. On the other hand, an increase in the stand-
ard rate, according to the IMF’s research (2013), has not been used in any country 
for strategic tax shifting from labor and profit taxation to taxation on consump-
tion, property and green taxes, in order to achieve a desirable long-term, growth-
friendly tax structure, not even for short-term fiscal devaluation, in terms of rev-
enue neutral transfer of the tax burden from labor taxation to consumption taxa-
tion, as suggested by Mooij and Keen (2012). Instead of providing a stimulus to 
spending and economic activity, high standard rates and the current scale of rates 
have acted pro-cyclical, deepening distortions in the market and slowing down the 
coming out of the crisis. Directions in tax reforms in the EU confirm the conclu-
sion made by Crawford, Keen and Smith that it is political will that is primarily d
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307 needed for a restructuring of the VAT system, for least recognizing the unfairness 
and wastefulness of the existing rate structure (IFS, 2010a).
Analyzing trends in evolution of the VAT system in the EU Member States, Bird 
considers that the current VAT model, which is called a “first generation” model, 
should be transformed into a “second generation” model, modeled on the compre-
hensive taxation of consumption in New Zealand or Australia (IFS, 2010a). Bird 
noted that even in these countries there is also a possibility for further customiza-
tion of the VAT model and rate structure in the direction of achieving the ideal 
model of the “third generation”.
2.2 REVIEW OF METHODOLOGY UsED FOR VAT EFFICIENCY ANALYsIs
Comparative international evidence suggests the conclusion that a transition from 
a sales tax to the VAT system produced a strong increase of revenue worldwide. 
According to IMF research, the immediate effects of VAT introduction on reve-
nues by regions amounted, on average, to 1.1 % of GDP (Ebrill, 2001), but in the 
long run VAT adoption increased the tax burden (revenue-to-GDP ratio) by 4.5% 
(Keen and Lockwood, 2007). Evidence from neighboring countries confirms the 
IMF’s conclusion. According to the data from the Ministry of Finance in the first 
year of VAT introduction Croatia collected even 47.6% more VAT and lagging 
sales  tax  than  in  the  previous  year,  or  30%  more  than  projected  (Jelčić  and 
Bejaković, 2012). However, after the introduction of the zero rate on foodstuffs in 
Croatia, VAT collection declined by 10%. Similarly, a moderate increase of VAT 
revenues of 5.9% in Serbia illustrated the negative influence of reduced rates on 
initial VAT effects. VAT collection is affected not only by the rates but by a number 
of other factors. Some of them are related to the VAT system while the others are 
of an external character. The OECD (2012) classifies factors that affect the effi-
ciency of VAT collection into five categories: (1) structural characteristics, (2) the 
evolution of consumption, (3) the taxation rules in international trade, (4) the ca-
pacity of the tax administration, and (5) tax discipline of taxpayers. Structural 
factors include basic elements of VAT design: rates, exemptions, the base and 
threshold for VAT registration. Keen (2013) believes that the main factors affect-
ing revenue collection from VAT are: (1) the standard rate, (2) efficiency, measured 
by C-efficiency ratio, and (3) the share of consumption in GDP. It is very difficult 
to give a general assessment of VAT system efficiency in a country. Despite the 
common principles of taxation of goods and services and invoice-credit methods, 
systems of VAT in different countries differ from each other, starting from the 
structure of rates, basis, refund rules and other elements of VAT system design. 
For this reason Keen is of the opinion that more reliable estimates of VAT effi-
ciency in a country can be gained by analyzing the movement of indicators of VAT 
efficiency over a longer period. 
Influenced by the global expansion of VAT in the last two decades and under re-
searches of the OECD, IMF and EU, several criteria for evaluating the efficiency 
of the VAT system have been developed, such as the efficiency ratio, which is also d
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308 known as VAT productivity ratio (Ebrill et al., 2001), and the VAT revenue ratio 
(VRR), which is called by the IMF the C-efficiency ratio. 
The efficiency ratio (productivity) of VAT is calculated by dividing revenues actu-
ally collected from VAT and potential revenues obtained by applying the standard 
VAT rate on GDP. Although it has been used for many years as a comprehensive 
measure of efficiency, the reliability of the efficiency ratio is not high mainly due 
to errors in the measurement of GDP, as a result of excluding non-observed ac-
tivities in the calculation of GDP. The reliability of GDP, and thus all indicators 
that rely on GDP, is inversely proportional to the degree of the non-observed econ-
omy of a given country. In addition to errors and uncertainty in the measurement 
of GDP, a fundamental shortcoming of the productivity ratio of VAT is of a con-
ceptual nature, since the ratio is based on a production rather than the consump-
tion type of VAT, which is found in most countries in the world (Ebrill et al., 
2001). Besides the common efficiency ratio, Martinez-Vazquez and Bird (2010) 
introduced a “non-standard” efficiency ratio, called the “ratio of gross VAT collec-
tion”, which is calculated only on the basis of expenditures on the final consump-
tion of households. 
In order to improve the quality of VAT efficiency measurement the OECD devel-
oped its VAT revenue ratio (VRR). This ratio measures the deviation of actual 
VAT collection in respect to a potential base, calculated by applying the standard 
rate on the potential base – final consumption with VAT previously excluded 
(OECD, 2012). The VRR decomposition developed indicators that can be used to 
quantify the impact of the policy gap and compliance gap on the efficiency of VAT 
collection (OECD, 2012). In this way, the C-efficiency is not only an indicator of 
the VAT efficiency and gap ratio between the revenue collected and the potential 
VAT revenue. The indicator is also an analytical tool that indicates the factors 
which contribute to the VAT gap and thus measures and policies by which it is 
possible to increase the efficiency of VAT collection without increasing the tax 
burden. 
The effectiveness of the VAT reform can be measured on the basis of the work 
efficiency and capacity of the tax administration. The OECD (2013) and IMF 
(Tait, 1988) have developed a typology of indicators of the efficiency of tax ad-
ministrations, which are fundamentally based on the variation of the mutual rela-
tionships of several variables: costs of tax administration, the amount of revenue 
collected, the number of taxpayers, the number of tax officials. According to inter-
national standards of tax administration efficiency measurement, efficiency indi-
cators are reliable, comparable and relevant for further analyses only if the condi-
tions in which the administration operates in the long term (for example several 
years) remain unchanged. The recommendation is that the efficiency of tax ad-
ministrations should be measured in a period when there has been a consolidation 
of the tax administration (OECD, 2013). It is not possible to obtain a reliable in-
dicator of the work efficiency if the administration is in a phase of transition d
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309 (merger into a single institution) or an internal reorganization on a large-scale (for 
example regionalization of work). In addition, introduction of radical changes in 
tax policy (new types of taxes, the introduction of differentiated rates, changes in 
the threshold of taxation, etc.) or large movements of personnel and investment 
may influence efficiency of the tax administration. Almost all the above men-
tioned (cumulative) happened during the reform of indirect taxation in B&H, 
which “blurs” the true effects of work, i.e. results achieved are burdened by non-
standard one-time costs (occur in one or two fiscal years).
Ratio of imperfection of VAT policy shows the ratio of “legal” VAT obligation to 
“ideal” VAT obligation, i.e. the share of theoretical VAT revenue that can be charged 
using the current law in relation to the potential revenue from VAT on total expen-
ditures for final consumption (CASE, 2013). Starting from the basic concept of 
Mooij and Keen (2012) and the elaborated methodology of Keen (2013) a further 
decomposition of the C-efficiency has been made on the component which meas-
ures the impact of a reduced rate(s) (the rate gap) and the component of exemption 
(the exemption gap) on the extent of policy gap. As distinct from the methodology 
of  the  OECD  (2012)  Keen’s  calculation  of  the  mentioned  components  of 
(in)efficiency of VAT is based on the application of the weighted average rate of 
VAT on total consumption (Mathis, 2004). Martinez-Vazquez and Bird (2010) 
emphasize that the compliance gap involves the interconnection of two factors – 
tax discipline (tax morale) and effectiveness of tax administration. VAT system is 
subject to frauds particularly in refunds. Having in mind the fractional character 
of VAT it is necessary to analyze at which stage the most extensive VAT frauds are 
possible, Keen and Lockwood (2007) argue that there is a positive relation be-
tween the openness of the economy, in terms of reliance on imports of goods, and 
the collection efficiency of VAT. In contrast, the openness of the economy, in 
terms of the importance of exports, may be a critical factor in VAT efficiency 
(Keen and Smith, 2007). The OECD has also developed a ratio for dynamic mon-
itoring of tax debts, necessary for compliance gap analysis, which measures trends 
of total accumulated tax debts in relation to annual net tax collection (OECD, 
2013). The OECD research on tax debts shows a rapid growing trend of total tax 
debts in the post-crisis period in only a few EU member states. 
The EU developed two concepts relevant for VAT efficiency analysis. The indica-
tor “VAT reduced rate and base indicator”, created by De Laet and Wöhlbier 
(2008) and widely accepted by the EU, points out the difference between the stat-
utory standard rate and the VAT component of implicit rate, expressed as a per-
centage of the standard rate. This indicator points out the significance of reduced 
rates, zero rate and exemptions in the VAT system and the size of deviations from 
the pure, theoretical concept of taxation of overall consumption by a single VAT 
rate. Another approach to the analysis of the theoretical base for VAT involves the 
application of the implicit rate methodology dividing net VAT revenues by final 
consumption expenditures for households (EU, 2013).d
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310 Empirical research on VAT efficiency in B&H relies on the relevant international 
methodology in that field, with slight revisions where necessary, mainly due to lack 
of data or specific circumstances related to B&H. It should be noted that B&H only 
a few years ago began to publish statistics of GDP based on expenditure method; a 
subsequent recalculation was made for previous periods. As the reliability of the 
national account statistics is much higher in developed economies than in develop-
ing countries and countries in transition when forming conclusions based on the 
obtained ratios of VAT efficiency in B&H a high level of grey economy should also 
be taken into account. According to the latest survey the grey economy in B&H is 
estimated at 26.52% of GDP in the period 2001-2003 while in 2008 it came to 
22.76% of GDP (Tomaš, 2010). The economic reforms in the sphere of taxation, of 
which the most significant is the introduction of VAT, are highlighted as the most 
important factors that have contributed to improving the situation. It should be em-
phasized that available statistics of consumption in B&H do not allow precise quan-
tification of the VAT gap in line with the EU methodology (Reckon, 2006). 
For the purpose of the assessment, the statistics of final consumption expenditures 
of households were used, structured only by basic COICOP1 classification codes 
(01-12). Bearing in mind legal provisions the exempted consumption includes 
expenditures on health services (06), recreation and culture (09), education (10) 
and others (12), where social and financial services are dominant as well as insur-
ance services. Expenditures on housing, etc. (04) include expenses that are not 
subject to VAT (imputed rent for housing) or on which VAT should generally not 
be paid (actual rents for housing) under the existing Law. In 2012 a reassessment 
of imputed rent for housing was made for the period 2000-2011. As the estimate 
of the imputed rent in 2012 has not been published yet, for the purpose of this 
paper the amount of imputed rent for 2012 is estimated at the level of 2011. 
The analysis and author’s calculations presented in this paper are based on the set 
of official macroeconomic indicators and external trade statistics in the period of 
implementation of VAT in B&H, provided by the Agency for Statistics of B&H2 
and the estimation of macroeconomic trends for 2013, internally prepared by the 
Directorate for Economic Planning3. Fiscal data (collection of indirect taxes and 
fiscal operation of general government) are internally available at the Indirect Tax 
Authority (ITA)4 database, the database of the Macroeconomic Analysis Unit of 
the ITA Governing Board (MAU)5 and from the Central Bank6 of B&H where 
necessary.
1 Statistics on consumption in B&H is categorized under the UN COICOP classification (Classification of 
  Individual Consumption According to Purpose) only by grouping items under basic two-digit classification 
(01-12). Standard COICOP classification includes an additional breakdown within each code (see http://unstats.
un.org/UNSD/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=5&Lg=1). 
2 www.bhas.ba.
3 www.dep.gov.ba.
4 www.uino.gov.ba.
5 www.oma.uino.gov.ba.
6 www.cbbh.ba.d
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311 3 THE sYsTEM OF VAT IN BOsNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
3.1 BAsIC CHARACTERIsTICs OF THE CONCEpT 
VAT was introduced in B&H on 1 January 2006. VAT introduction was the final 
phase of a comprehensive reform of the indirect taxation system. In addition to the 
transfer of constitutional authority and centralization of legislation and adminis-
tration of indirect taxes, the reform included the redefinition of the funding system 
of all levels of government in the complex and decentralized fiscal structure of 
B&H and incorporation of elements of cooperative and executive federalism in 
the indirect tax policy sphere in B&H (Antić, 2009). 
The VAT system applied in B&H is of the consumption type and invoice-credit 
method, which in principle implies the right to deduct VAT on all supplies of 
goods and services, except for a small number of constraints defined by the Law 
on VAT (“the Law”). From the introduction of VAT, a single rate in the amount of 
17% applied. Although initiatives for the introduction of differentiated VAT rates 
are continuously present, especially during the election period, due to the specific 
way of decision-making in the area of indirect taxation (Antić, 2013) in the com-
plex and highly decentralized fiscal structure of B&H, which requires the consent 
of Entities (i.e., the Federation B&H and the Republic of Srpska), it was not pos-
sible to reach a political consensus. Analyses have shown that the introduction of 
a reduced rate of 8% on goods and services under Annex III of the Directive 
would require an increase of the standard rate to 24% (Antić, 2011a). The VAT 
registration threshold is prescribed in the amount of BAM 50,000 (EUR 25,565), 
but small firms, whose annual turnover is below the threshold for registration, 
have the option of voluntary VAT registration. Similarly, the threshold for registra-
tion for farmers amounts to BAM 15,000 (EUR 7.669), with the possibility of 
voluntary registration. The tax period is one month. VAT returns are submitted 
within ten days of the end of the tax period, and in the same terms taxpayers are 
obliged to pay the VAT obligation. VAT refunds to predominant exporters are car-
ried out within 30 days while to other taxpayers VAT refunds are paid within 60 
days. The taxpayer has the right to choose a tax credit instead of refunds, with the 
exception of the first year of the implementation of VAT when other taxpayers 
were allowed the tax credit instead of the right to a refund. The ITA is obliged to 
pay unused amount of tax credit within a period of six months. At the time of the 
introduction of VAT the Law on VAT was fully compliant with the EU Sixth Di-
rective on VAT. Exemptions from VAT were limited to public sector services, so-
cial services, postal, financial and insurance services. In some segments the Law 
included what was then the best practice of the leading EU member states in the 
fight against tax evasion, which was later incorporated in the recast of Council 
Directive 2006/112/EC. 
3.2 DEROGATIONs FROM THE VAT CONCEpT 
Despite the strong commitment of local fiscal authorities and the international 
community in B&H there were derogations from the basic concept of VAT in 
B&H at the end of 2005, just before the introduction of VAT. After the war, post-d
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312 Dayton B&H used huge amounts of international assistance for recovery and re-
construction and later to build the required institutions, infrastructure and major 
construction ventures. At the initiative of the International Community changes to 
the Law were made in order to enable VAT refunds to beneficiaries of interna-
tional relief projects approved by the B&H Council of Ministers. As the term 
“relief” is not precisely defined in the Law the right to a refund is interpreted in an 
extensive way. VAT refunds were approved not only for international projects in-
volving non-refundable and interest-free grants and donations but also for credit 
arrangements concluded with low interest rates, raising the question of potential 
discrimination of projects financed by domestic credit funds in relation to interna-
tional credit arrangements. 
Another derogation from the Law was made at the end of 2008, when exemptions 
from paying VAT on imports and supplies of goods and services in the country 
within the EU projects financed by Instruments for Pre-Accession Assistance of 
EU–IPA were allowed, in accordance with the Regulation of the Council no. 
1085/2006. This regulation stipulates that “Community financing shall in princi-
ple not be used for paying taxes, duties or charges in beneficiary countries listed 
in Annexes I and II”. Although the exemption from VAT may be made directly, on 
delivery of goods and services, or indirectly, through subsequent refunds, B&H 
has opted for a model of exemptions, regardless the fact that this model can create 
space for VAT frauds. 
4 TRENDs IN VAT COLLECTION (2006-2013)
Switching from the sales tax to VAT brought strong fiscal effects in first two years 
of implementation. If the VAT system efficiency in B&H were measured by the 
amount of revenue collected as compared that in the period in which the sales tax 
was in force, it could be concluded that the reform of indirect taxation was a very 
successful reform. In 2006 as much as 51% more tax was collected in VAT and 
lagging sales tax than in 2005. Projections of revenue from VAT/sales tax for 2006 
were exceeded by 17.5%. The first year of the VAT introduction was also specific 
for the significant share of lagging sales tax, as a result of the increase in imports 
of goods and services that were not taxed or taxed at a lower rate of sales tax 
(10%) before the introduction of VAT. Low refunds contributed to a high initial 
VAT collection for two reasons. Due to the characteristics of the administration of 
VAT, the first refunds were paid in March 2006. Secondly, the Law prescribed the 
suspension of VAT refunds to other taxpayers during 2006. Due to these circum-
stances the implementation of the Decision adopted by the Indirect Taxation Au-
thority Governing Board (ITA GB) on the allocation to the reserve account for 
refund payments in the amount of 10% of collected indirect taxes led to a surplus 
in the reserves account of 0.5% of GDP. The abolition of suspension of VAT re-
funds to other taxpayers led to a strong increase in VAT refunds. As refund re-
quests exceeded the limit of reserves allocation during 2007 there was first a slow-d
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313 down in refunds payment and then a blockade of payments. Problems with refund 
payments resulted in the transfer of a significant portion of refunds from 2007 to 
2008, which had a positive impact on the fiscal balance in 2007 while on the other 
hand it burdened the fiscal balance in 2008. “The refund crisis” was resolved by 
removing administrative constraints on the allocation of refunds and switching to 
a flexible financial management of the distribution of revenues collected from in-
direct taxes, taking into account the deadlines for payment of refunds, payment of 
external debt and financing the budget of all levels of government (Antić, 2013). 
In addition to the massive transfer of refunds, the year 2008 was also character-
ized by a strong growth in VAT collection caused by the increase in prices of raw 
materials, food and energy-generating products on the world market. The first 
signs of the crisis occurred in the fourth quarter of 2008 when taxpayers, in order 
to maintain liquidity, opted for VAT refunds instead of tax credits. The share of 
VAT refunds in the mentioned quarter reached a maximum of 26.7% of gross VAT, 
so the net collection of VAT was negative for the first time since the introduction 
of VAT (chart 1). The year 2009 recorded negative trends in VAT collection as a 
result of the fall in consumption and economic activities. 
Chart 1
Trends in VAT collection, change in %, q/q
Source: Database of Macroeconomic Analysis Unit of the ITA Governing Board (MAU).
The first signs of the recovery of the economy in B&H were recorded in 2010. The 
growth of the economy in 2010 led to an increase in consumption and VAT reve-
nues, which, during 2011 and then in 2012, exceeded the effects of pre-crisis 
2008. The continuous trend of positive growth in VAT revenues, which lasted for 
ten quarters, was interrupted in the fourth quarter of 2012. Despite the forecast 
positive economic growth, the increase of refunds (table 1) to taxpayers and inter-
national projects in 2013, frauds and VAT debts, led to a decline in VAT net col-
lection of 1.9%. d
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5   IMpLICATIONs OF sTRUCTURAL CHARACTERIsTICs  
ON VAT COLLECTION IN BOsNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
5.1 VAT RATE
Tax reform in B&H, which entailed replacing sales tax with VAT, according to 
intention of fiscal authorities, should have been a revenue-neutral reform. Accord-
ing to estimates, the same level of revenues as in the sales tax system could have 
been achieved by applying a VAT rate of 16%. However, given the high rate of tax 
evasion, especially in a highly decentralized country like B&H, in order to neu-
tralize the risk, a statutory rate of 17% was determined. The excess of achieved 
revenues from VAT over those projected indicate that the introduction of VAT led 
to a reduction of the grey economy and tax evasion in B&H. The number of VAT 
taxpayers in relation to the projected number, calculated on the basis of the records 
of sales taxpayers, was doubled as early as the time for VAT registration. Starting 
from the tax base from 2005 it can be concluded that the same level of revenues 
in 2006 could be accomplished with a rate of 13.5%. Any further increase in the 
VAT rate by 0.14 percentage points corresponded to an increase in revenues by 
0.86 percentage points. Given that B&H was committed to align the VAT system 
with EU rules, the standard rate could have been as low as 15%. However, even 
with that lowest allowed rate B&H would have been able to accomplish a revenue 
growth in 2006 of 9.5%. Given the large discrepancy between the revenue-neutral 
VAT rate and the statutory rate it can be concluded that the statutory VAT rate was 
an important factor in the efficiency of VAT collection in the first years of its im-
plementation in B&H. 
table 2
VAT refunds, as % of gross VAT
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Total VAT refunds 12.1 17.7 23.0 20.6 19.3 21.6 21.6 24.1
VAT refunds to taxpayers 11.3 16.6 21.8 18.6 17.3 19.2 19.4 21.5
VAT refunds to 
international projects
  0.8   1.1   1.1   1.9   2.0   2.4   2.1   2.7
Source: ITA.
table 1
Trends in VAT
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Net VAT collection, in bn BAM    2.7   2.9   3.1   2.8   3.0   3.1   3.2   3.1
As % of total revenues  
of general government
  31.5* 29.2 28.6 27.1 27.9 28.2 28.2 27.9
As % of GDP 12.6 12.3 12.0 11.0 11.6 11.8 11.6 11.0
* Figure for 2006 includes VAT and outstanding sales tax declared for 2005, but collected in 2006.
Source: Author’s calculation; indirect tax revenues: Indirect Tax Authority (ITA); general govern-
ment revenues: Central Bank of B&H (2006-2008)/MAU (2009-2013); GDP: Agency for Statistics 
of B&H (2006-2012)/Directorate for Economic Planning (estimation for 2013). d
i
n
k
a
 
a
n
t
i
ć
:
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
c
y
 
o
f
 
a
 
s
i
n
g
l
e
-
r
a
t
e
 
a
n
d
 
b
r
o
a
d
-
b
a
s
e
d
 
v
a
t
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
:
 
t
h
e
 
c
a
s
e
 
o
f
 
b
o
s
n
i
a
 
a
n
d
 
h
e
r
z
e
g
o
v
i
n
a
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
t
h
e
o
r
y
 
a
n
d
 
p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
3
8
 
(
3
)
 
3
0
3
-
3
3
5
 
(
2
0
1
4
)
315 The trend in the effective VAT rate in the period 2006-2013, calculated on the 
basis of the actual collection of VAT and expenditures for final consumption (IFS, 
2011), reveals strong fluctuations (table 3) which can be explained by comparing 
trends in VAT collection and expenditures for final consumption. Given the differ-
ent trends of government and private components of final consumption, it can be 
noted that in time the range between calculated effective rates increases as a result 
of the growth of government expenditures for final consumption. 
table 3
VAT rate in B&H, in %
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Statutory rate 17.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 17.0
Effective VAT rate, based on 
final consumption expenditure
12.3 13.4 12.8 11.8 12.3 12.6 12.4 12.0
Effective VAT rate, based on 
households’ final consumption 
expenditure
15.5 16.6 15.9 14.9 15.7 16.5 16.4 15.8
Weighted average VAT rate  16.9 16.8 16.8 16.6 16.6 16.5 16.5 16.4
Source: Author’s calculation; VAT revenue: ITA; consumption: Agency for Statistics of B&H 
(2006-2012)/Directorate for Economic Planning (estimation for 2013).
Trends in VAT collection and consumption until 2012 (chart 2) confirm the con-
clusion of the empirical studies conducted by Sancak, Velloso and Xing (2010) 
that the changes in revenues from VAT as a dominant type of consumption taxes 
become sharper in relation to changes in economic trends. However, in the last 
two years, a fall in VAT collection and a growth in consumption have led to a drop 
in the effective VAT rate, although economic growth was recorded.
Chart 2 
Trends in prices, final consumption, imports and VAT, in %
Source: VAT revenue: ITA/MAU; CPI/consumption/import of goods: Agency for Statistics of B&H 
(2006-2012)/Directorate for Economic Planning (estimation for 2013).d
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5.2 VAT BAsE
Starting from the fact that the VAT system in B&H has a single rate, VAT collec-
tion is directly determined by movements in the base (consumption). Bearing in 
mind that B&H introduced the VAT system with a wide base and a strictly limited 
scope of exemptions from VAT, the movement of the base (consumption) should 
have been determined by the movement of the economy, employment and prices. 
However, the basis for the VAT calculation was to some extent altered by the in-
troduction of exemptions for supplies of goods and services within projects fi-
nanced from IPA funds and by the approval of VAT refunds based on international 
projects. According to data released, the amount of exempted VAT on imported 
goods is negligible, while for the exemption in the country there are only the 
records of approved certificates of exemptions. According to available data and 
estimates the amount of lost VAT in the period 2010-2012 ranged around 1% of 
net VAT, i.e. 0.1% of GDP. However, since exemptions in the country always 
represent an incentive for tax frauds, tax expenditures of this derogation are cer-
tainly higher. In the coming years, after the removal of political blockages, the 
financing of EU projects through IPA funds is expected to be strengthened, and 
greater tax expenditures will thus be generated. 
Although the VAT system is based on the standard rate, VAT refunds in the case of 
international projects de facto have the same effects as the application of the zero 
VAT rate on domestic trade of goods and services. The impact of indirect applica-
tion of the zero rate can be quantified using the methodology which Mathis (2004) 
used to calculate the weighted average rate of VAT. Due to the application of the 
zero rate on domestic trade the weighted average rate for 2013 deviates for 0.57 
percentage points compared to the statutory rate of 17% (table 3). 
A comparison of weighted average and effective VAT rate on the total expenditure 
for final consumption in B&H with EU member states calculated by Borselli, 
Chiri and Romagnano (2012) points out that only two member states (Cyprus and 
Luxembourg) have a lower tax burden of expenditures for final consumption than 
B&H, while the tax burden on taxable consumption in B&H is at the level of the 
weighted average VAT rate in the EU. 
From the overview given in table 4 it can be seen that the share of the taxable base 
on which VAT was not paid due to the indirect application of the zero VAT rate 
increased year by year, with the expectations that in the coming years, due to ma-
jor infrastructure projects (construction of highways network) it will be more im-
portant. 
In order to analyze the impact of evolution on the basis of revenue collection from 
VAT it is necessary to assess the theoretical basis for VAT under the applicable 
regulations based on analysis of consumer trends and changes in its structure. The d
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table 4 
Decomposition of taxable base, in %
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Standard rate 99.13 98.66 98.55 97.72 97.55 96.99 97.37 96.63
Zero rate   0.87   1.34   1.45   2.28   2.45   3.01   2.63   3.37
Source: Author’s calculation; VAT revenue: ITA/MAU.
difference between the actual revenue collected from VAT and the theoretical VAT 
liability represents the VAT gap. 
table 5 
Decomposition of final consumption, in % 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Standard rate 72.1 79.0 75.0 69.1 72.3 74.0 73.1
Zero rate   0.0   0.0   1.1   1.6   1.8   2.3   2.0
Non-taxed base   6.5  -0.7   2.6   8.2   5.7   3.9   5.6
Exempted, IPA   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.1   0.7   0.5   0.8
Exempted base, other 21.4 21.7 21.2 21.0 19.5 19.3 18.6
Source: Author’s calculation; consumption: Agency for Statistics of B&H.
Calculations (table 5) show an increase in the VAT gap – that part of the taxable 
base on which VAT should have been charged since 2008, on account of the tax-
able base. Despite a growth in the taxable base after a sharp drop in 2009 every-
thing points to the erosion of the VAT base. 
Chart 3 shows the contribution of components to the movement of final consump-
tion, measured in percentage of GDP. The growth of final consumption in 2008 was 
a result of the growth of the base on which VAT is charged as well as of the growth 
of exempted consumption and consumption that was supposed to be taxable (the 
VAT gap). The strong decrease in revenues from VAT in 2009 is a result of the   
simultaneous effects of two negative trends, the fall of the base on which VAT is 
charged and the growth of VAT gap. In the next two years the consumption growth 
was mainly the result of the growth of the taxable base on which VAT is charged 
and the fall of tax evasion. However, positive trends were stopped in 2012. 
The taxable base can be calculated as the difference between final consumption 
expenditures reduced by the amount of VAT paid, and consumption exempted 
from VAT, including exemptions for IPA funds. The taxable base is further divided 
into the base on which VAT is charged and the base that has remained non-taxable. 
The structure of the taxable base includes the value of goods and services supplied 
on the basis of international projects for which VAT is refunded. The base which 
is taxed at a zero rate is calculated from data on refunds to international projects. d
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Applying the EU concept of implicit tax rate (ITR) to trends of consumption and 
the collection of VAT in B&H, fluctuations in the amount of implicit rate and ap-
parent downward trend can be noted in the last two years (table 6). 
Applying EU methodology for calculating the “VAT reduced rate and base indica-
tor” in B&H (table 6) an illogical situation in 2007 can be seen as a result of a 
surplus generated by transferring refund payments from 2007 to 2008. In other 
years one can see an increase in the variation related to the statutory standard rate, 
which may be the result of two factors – the widening of non-taxable base or re-
duction of efficiency in VAT collection. The widening of the non-taxable base can 
be explained by increasing VAT frauds, as well as by the effects of exempting 
trade of goods and services financed from IPA projects, which, given that it is dif-
ficult to control them, may represent an incentive for frauds. Finally, the strong tax 
evasion induced by differentiated excise policy, which has escalated in the last 
two years, has led to changes in consumer’s behavior. Substitution of cigarettes 
table 6 
VAT component of Implicit Tax Rate
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
ITR VAT, in % 13.6 14.9 14.3 13.5 14.0 14.4 14.2 13.6
Change Y/Y, in %  n/a   9.5  -3.4  -5.8   3.9   2.2  -1.3  -4.0
VAT base indicator, in p.p.   1.0  -0.3   0.2   1.0   0.5   0.2   0.4   0.9
Source: Author’s calculation; VAT revenue: ITA/MAU; consumption: Agency for Statistics of B&H 
(2006-2012)/Directorate for Economic Planning (estimation for 2013).
Source: Author’s calculation; VAT refunds: ITA; consumption: Agency for Statistics of B&H.
Chart 3 
Decomposing changes in final consumption, % of GDPd
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319 with fine-cut tobacco, as well as substitution of diesel fuel with heating oil re-
sulted in the erosion of the taxable base for VAT. Notwithstanding the foregoing, 
in comparison with the values of indicators for EU member states (EU, 2011), the 
deviation of the implicit from the statutory VAT rate in B&H is minimal, as the 
result of a broad base and application of the standard VAT rate. 
5.3 VAT THREsHOLD
The threshold for registration is, in addition to the rate and base, the third important 
factor in the design of VAT system. According to standards of the OECD (2012) by 
the height of the threshold for registration of VAT, B&H can be considered as a 
country with a relatively high threshold. In relation to the EU member states thresh-
old for registration in B&H is about the arithmetic average of the EU (chart 4).
The application of a relatively high threshold for registration should have positive 
effects on the VAT collection due to the cascading effect of input VAT contained in 
costs of small firms that are not registered for VAT, the financial sector, post office 
and others exempted from VAT. Despite the relatively high threshold, a sharp in-
crease in the number of taxpayers was recorded. One of the reasons is the significant 
migration of companies from the grey to the regular economy, as one-off effect of 
VAT introduction. Another important factor is the legal option of voluntary registra-
tion for small businesses. According to internal data of the ITA about 40% of regis-
tered taxpayers are related to voluntary registration. Net contribution of this group 
of taxpayers to the revenue collection is negligible, since refunds to small firms al-
most annul the tax obligation. Finally, the increase in the number of taxpayers is a 
logical consequence of the growth impact of CPI (see chart 2) during the period of 
implementation of VAT on the amount of trade of small firms. The fact that the real 
value of the threshold for registration in 2013 was 20% lower than in 2005, when the 
initial registration for VAT was carried out (chart 5), points to the conclusion that 
some small firms in this period reached the legal threshold for registration. 
Chart 4 
VAT threshold in the EU, in thousands of euro
Source: IBFD (2013); author’s calculation.d
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6 IMpLICATION OF REFORM pROCEssEs 
6.1 IMpLICATIONs ON THE VAT COLLECTION 
In addition to internal factors, which came out of the basic elements of the VAT 
concept and VAT policy, the collection of revenues from VAT in B&H is also in-
fluenced by regional and global integration processes which B&H has joined. 
The time of implementation of VAT in B&H coincided with the implementation of 
the process of foreign trade liberalization. In the first phase, which began in 2007, 
joining CEFTA (Central European Free Trade Agreement) B&H abolished almost 
all customs duties in goods trade with neighboring countries. The second phase of 
liberalization, which began in mid-2008 with the application of the EU Stabiliza-
tion and Association Agreement, entailed a gradual reduction in imports of goods 
originating from the EU to customs duty-free imports within the period of five 
years. Given the dominant share of trade with the EU and neighboring countries 
in foreign trade (around 85%) the process of liberalization has led to a sharp de-
crease in revenues from customs duties. The third phase of the process of foreign 
trade liberalization implied the abolition of non-fiscal customs barriers with the 
fiscal effects on imports of goods from third countries since the fourth quarter of 
2011. It was expected that the liberalization process would produce direct losses 
in revenues from customs duties, but also indirectly, through the increased substi-
tution of imports from third countries, which remained burdened by customs, by 
customs-free imports from the EU and under CEFTA. However, activation of the 
domestic Oil Refinery at the beginning of 2009, led to a strong growth in oil im-
ports from Russia. Consequently, additional customs revenues from imports from 
Russia partially offset losses made in the process of foreign trade liberalization. 
Chart 5 
VAT threshold in B&H 
Source: Author’s calculation; VAT revenue: ITA/MAU; CPI: Agency for Statistics of B&H (2006-
2012)/Directorate for Economic Planning (estimation for 2013).d
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321 The main objective of the indirect taxation system reform in B&H was the harmo-
nization of indirect tax policy with EU standards. The introduction of VAT repre-
sented a key condition for the start of the harmonization process of indirect taxes. 
At the height of the crisis B&H started with the process of the harmonization of 
tobacco products excises with the minimum EU standards. The new Law on Ex-
cise Duties, which came into force on 1 of July 2009, introduced a minimum ex-
cise duty and a structured rate of excise duty on cigarettes (ad valorem and spe-
cific). The process of harmonization implies a constant increase in the specific 
excise duty in order to achieve the minimum excise duty on cigarettes in the EU. 
In the period 2008-2012 the weighted average retail selling price of cigarettes 
doubled, while revenues from excise duties on tobacco increased by 110%. The 
increase in excise duties on cigarettes has significantly contributed to the collec-
tion of additional VAT revenues, given that the value of the cigarette market in-
creased 35% over that of 2008. However, as the increase of the tax burden on 
cigarettes has not been accompanied by adequate harmonization of excise duties 
on cut tobacco, the growing gap between the taxation of cigarettes and cut tob-
acco, as a substitute, has led to strong tax evasion and the expansion of the black 
market. As a result, for the first time in 2013 a negative growth in revenues from 
excise duties on tobacco was recorded and thus a negative contribution of excise 
duties on tobacco to the growth in revenues from VAT. 
In order to provide funds for the repayment of international loans for the develop-
ment of a network of highways B&H, in the middle of 2009, in addition to the 
existing road tax in the price of oil derivatives, introduced an additional road tax 
earmarked for the development of highways. Both road taxes have the character-
istics of excise duties on oil, by the method of collection and the impact on the 
basis for calculation of VAT. Since the road tax is paid on motor fuels only, the 
introduction of the additional road tax has increased the gap between tax burden 
on motor derivatives and heating oil, which has stimulated the use of heating oil 
as motor fuel, producing tax evasion with negative consequences for the collec-
tion of road taxes and VAT. 
When assessing the effects of the mentioned reforms on the collection of certain 
types of revenues from indirect taxes, a baseline scenario was created, which as-
sumes an unchanged policy of indirect taxes (customs duties, excise duties, VAT) 
for the period 2006-2013. Nominal fiscal effects on the VAT collection, obtained 
by applying macroeconomic indicators (imports, consumption, CPI) on the col-
lection of certain types of revenues starting from the base 2006 year, have in the 
last three years been around 0.3% of GDP (table 7).
It should be noted that the calculated effects on the VAT collection only refer to 
aggregate positive effects on excise duties on tobacco and additional road taxes. 
Bearing in mind the phase character of VAT as a form of tax, collection of less 
VAT on imports due to any possible customs value reduction occurring after the 
elimination of customs duties, does not necessarily mean an actual reduction in d
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322 net VAT. This can occur only in the case of cost-elastic products where the reduc-
tion of the customs basis could lead to a reduction in retail prices and thus in VAT. 
Due to the high index of the B&H economy openness (around 45%), measured 
according to the OECD methodology (2011), the reliance on imports and domi-
nant share of trade with the EU and neighboring countries in foreign trade (around 
85%), it was expected that the reduction and then the abolition of customs duties 
on most imports should lead to the reduction in retail prices of goods and services 
and thus to the reduction in revenues from VAT. Another reason tending to support 
those expectations was that the liberalization of imports from the EU took place at 
a time of global economic crisis, a fall in income, consumption and economic 
activity. However, a continuous growth in retail prices, recorded in previous years, 
led to the conclusion that the savings on customs duties spilled over into extra 
profit without compromising the net VAT base/collection. 
table 7 
Effects of reforms 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Net effect on VAT, as % of net VAT  0.93 2.07 2.34 2.49 2.33
Net effect on VAT, as % of GDP  0.10 0.24 0.27 0.29 0.26
Net effect on indirect taxes, as % of GDP -0.45 -0.20 0.36 0.25 0.24 0.04
Source: Author’s calculation.
Studies have shown that developing countries, under the pressure of the liberaliza-
tion process of foreign trade, have been faced with the problem of maintaining the 
level of revenue in a situation of progressive reduction in customs revenue. Baun-
sgaard and Keen (2005) considered that the continuation of the trade liberalization 
process in many developing countries would be brought to an end if alternative 
sources of revenue were not found. According to them, most developing countries 
manage to pay a maximum of 60% of lost revenues from the exchange, mainly by 
strategies to increase excise duties and VAT, although there are also countries that 
compensate for lack of revenues from indirect taxes by increasing the income tax. 
From the analysis of the effects of foreign trade liberalization in this paper it is 
implied that B&H is something of an exception among developing countries be-
cause it managed to compensate the loss of customs revenue as a result of trade 
liberalization fully every year by increasing excise duties on tobacco and oil de-
rivatives. However, the escalation of VAT refunds and debts as well as tax evasion 
in excise revenues as a result of the rapid growth of the tax burden and uncoordi-
nated policy of differentiated rates, led to the erosion of the VAT base and the loss 
of revenue from indirect taxes in the past two years. The fact that the net contribu-
tion of the reform to the level of indirect taxes in 2013 fell to a level of only 0.04% 
of GDP (table 7) suggests that B&H, in the case of continuing negative trends, 
will have no more opportunities to compensate losses of customs revenue by in-
creasing excise duties in the next step of foreign trade liberalization in the EU 
accession process. d
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6.2 IMpLICATIONs ON THE TAx sTRUCTURE 
The cumulative impact of global economic crisis, reforms and trade liberalization 
process led to changes in the structure of indirect taxes and tax burden, measured 
by percentage of GDP (table 8). 
table 8 
Tax structure in B&H
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
As % of GDP 
Indirect taxes 20.1 19.9 18.8 17.2 18.5 18.6 18.3 17.2
o/w VAT/STa 12.6 12.3 12.0 11.0 11.6 11.8 11.6 11.0
Customs duty   2.6   2.8   2.5   1.3   1.1   1.0   0.8   0.7
Excises   4.0   3.9   3.6   3.9   4.5   4.7   4.8   4.5
Road fees   0.8   0.8   0.7   1.0   1.2   1.1   1.1   1.0
Direct taxes   2.7   2.5   2.9   3.2   3.3   3.4   3.4   3.3
Social security contributions 11.9 12.5 13.7 14.3 15.0 15.1 14.9 14.4
As % of total revenue of general governmentb
Indirect taxes 50.2 47.2 45.0 42.6 44.5 44.6 44.4 43.8
o/w VAT/STa 31.5 29.2 28.6 27.1 27.9 28.2 28.2 27.9
Customs duty   6.5   6.6   5.9   3.3   2.8   2.5   2.0   1.9
Excises   9.3   8.8   8.4   9.0   9.3 10.5 11.3 11.7
Road fees   2.1   1.9   1.7   2.4   2.9   2.6   2.6   2.6
Direct taxes   6.8   5.9   7.0   7.9   7.9   8.1   8.2   8.5
Social security contributions 29.6 29.6 32.7 35.5 36.1 36.2 36.1 36.6
a Figure for 2006 includes VAT and outstanding sales tax declared for 2005, but collected in 
2006.
b Consolidated revenues of all levels of government (central level, entities, cantons, local level 
and extra-budgetary funds).
Source: Author’s calculation; indirect tax revenues: ITA/MAU; other revenues: Central Bank 
of B&H (2006-2008), MAU (2009-2013); GDP: Agency for Statistics of B&H (2006-2012)/
Directorate for Economic Planning (estimation for 2013). 
In the last two years a reduction in the collection of all types of indirect taxes was 
recorded. The distribution of contributions of VAT and other types of revenue in 
changes in total revenue collection from indirect taxes, measured by percentage of 
GDP, is shown in chart 6. 
Expenses for final consumption of households and governments are in addition to 
VAT also burdened by other taxes on consumption such as excises duties, customs 
duties, etc. In addition to the direct impact on the tax burden on final consumption 
other indirect taxes affect households indirectly, by being included in the basis for 
the VAT calculation. Keeping in mind economic reforms in B&H and implications 
of foreign trade liberalization through the analysis of components of the implicit 
rate on consumption it is possible to consider the direct impact of other indirect 
taxes on the VAT component. Chart 7 shows downward trends in ITR components d
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324 on tobacco as a result of the strong tax evasion in the last two years. On the other 
hand, it can be noted that negative ITR related to other revenues (customs duties) 
is weakening as the five-year process of foreign trade liberalization with the EU is 
closer to its end. 
Chart 6 
Contribution of tax types to total indirect tax performance, % of GDP
Source: Author’s calculation; GDP: Agency for Statistics of B&H (2006-2012)/Directorate for 
Economic Planning (estimation for 2013). 
Source: Author’s calculation; VAT revenues: ITA; consumption: Agency for Statistics of B&H 
(2006-2012)/Directorate for Economic Planning (estimation for 2013); other countries: OECD 
(2012).
Chart 7 
Decomposition of Implicit Tax Rate on consumption, change Y/Y, in %d
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325 7 EFFICIENCY OF VAT COLLECTION IN BOsNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
7.1 EFFICIENCY RATIO
The quality of the calculated ratios of the efficiency of the VAT system in B&H 
depends on the quality and structure of the existing statistics of national accounts 
in the country. For this reason certain adjustments of the potential taxable basis for 
VAT cannot be precisely determined in accordance with the OECD methodology 
(2012) and Keen (2013).
The efficiency ratio (productivity) in B&H in period 2006-2013 varied in the 
range 0.72-0.82. The maximum level was recorded in 2007 (0.82), and the mini-
mum in 2009 and 2013 (0.72). If final consumption is used as the denominator 
instead of GDP, the obtained efficiency ratio is slightly lower, as a result of the 
specific structure of GDP in B&H where consumption is dominant. 
table 9 
Efficiency ratio
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Based on GDP – “Productivity ratio” 0.79 0.85 0.82 0.75 0.80 0.81 0.80 0.75
Based on consumption 0.75 0.81 0.78 0.72 0.75 0.77 0.76 0.74
VAT gross collection ratio 0.91 0.98 0.94 0.87 0.92 0.97 0.96 0.93
Source: Author’s calculation; GDP/consumption: Agency for Statistics of B&H.
It is noted that fluctuations of “ratio of gross VAT collection” are sharper than fluc-
tuations of the efficiency ratio, as a result of sharper changes in final consumption 
of households than in total final consumption (table 9). 
For the purpose of analyzing the efficiency of VAT collection in B&H the amount 
of expenditure for final consumption (households, non-profit organizations and 
government) has been used as a denominator. In the period 2006-2013 in B&H 
VRR ranged from a minimum of 0.69 in 2009 to a maximum of 0.79 in 2007   
(table 10). 
table 10 
VAT Revenue Ratio
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
B&H 0.72 0.79 0.75 0.69 0.72 0.74 0.73 0.71
Chile 0.64 0.67 0.70 0.59 n.a n.a n.a n.a
Denmark 0.64 0.65 0.62 0.59 n.a n.a n.a n.a
Japan 0.70 0.69 0.67 0.67 n.a n.a n.a n.a
New Zealand 1.03 0.96 0.97 0.99 n.a n.a n.a n.a
Source: B&H – Author’s calculation; VAT revenue: ITA/MAU; consumption: Agency for Statistics 
of B&H (2006-2012)/Directorate for Economic Planning (estimation for 2013); other countries: 
OECD (2012).d
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326 Given the availability of data it is possible to compare VRR for B&H with other 
countries only for the period 2006-2009 (OECD, 2012). Another aggravating fac-
tor is the structure of the VAT systems of those countries for which data are avail-
able because most of them apply the VAT system with a scale of rates. In com-
parison with the results of the OECD’s survey it can be concluded that the VAT 
system in B&H is more efficient than in countries with a single rate, like Chile and 
Denmark, while it less efficient related to Japan (OECD, 2012). Comparison with 
the system in New Zealand represents de facto a comparison with the VAT regime 
which is close to the theoretical ideal. It is noted that due to the crisis in these 
countries the efficiency ratio fell, maximum (0.5) in Denmark and Chile, 0.04 in 
New Zealand and 0.03 in B&H and Japan. 
7.2 DECOMpOsING EFFICIENCY RATIO
According to the OECD methodology, policy efficiency ratio and compliance ef-
ficiency ratio are also calculated (OECD, 2012). Theoretical VAT revenues are 
obtained by applying the standard rate on the theoretical taxable base calculated 
on taxable components of consumption (see table 4).
7.2.1 policy gap
The weak oscillations of the coefficient of imperfection of VAT policy in B&H 
(table 11) are the result of derogations (exemptions from VAT on the supply of 
goods and services financed by IPA funds and refunds in the country with the ef-
fect of the zero rate). In general, the extent of the policy gap is significantly below 
the EU average, as expected, due to the application of the standard rate (CASE, 
2013). On the other hand, stronger oscillations are noted in the compliance ratio, 
which is measured as the ratio of VAT collected and the theoretical VAT revenues 
that can be collected by the applicable law. The ratio shows the proportion of “lost” 
revenues from VAT, i.e. tax expenditures. The ratio for 2007 exceeding 1 indicates 
cases emphasized by Keen (2013), when a high C-efficiency ratio does not neces-
sarily mean a better VAT system. Due to problems with allocating reserves for 
refunds, some of the refunds from 2007 were transferred to 2008 resulting in a 
higher net VAT collection in 2007. With the outbreak of the crisis the compliance 
efficiency fell to the lowest level of 0.90. The growth of ratios in the next two 
years was temporary. There was already in 2012 a deterioration of tax discipline 
table 11 
VAT revenue ratio decomposition in B&H
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Policy efficiency ratio  0.79 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.78
Rate differentiation (r) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
Exemptions (x) 0.79 0.78 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.78
Compliance efficiency ratio  0.92 1.01 0.97 0.90 0.93 0.96 0.94
Source: Author’s calculation; Consumption: Agency for Statistics of B&H.d
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327 among taxpayers which was manifested through increased refund requests that 
did not follow the growth of economic activities that affect them (exports, invest-
ments), increased payments of unused tax credits and expansion of various forms 
of VAT frauds. 
Despite the negligible impact of VAT policy on VAT efficiency we have performed 
a decomposition of the policy gap. Since B&H applies only the standard rate of 
VAT the rate gap in B&H should be zero. However, through derogations from the 
Law in the sphere of VAT payment within international projects, in an indirect 
way, the system included zero rate taxation in the country. Keen suggests that the 
effects of the zero rate should be included in the calculation of “exemption gap”, 
and not “rate gap”, because the part of consumption (base) for which the zero rate 
is applied is not included in the national account statistics (Keen, 2013). In the 
case of B&H we decide to include the effects of the zero rate in the rate gap for 
two reasons. First, unlike other countries that apply a zero VAT rate the applica-
tion of the zero rate in B&H is an indirect consequence of VAT refunds by inter-
national agreements on financing projects of national significance. Due to this 
specificity, the base for calculation of VAT, which will be refunded to the benefici-
ary of the project in the next step, can be easily identified through analytical 
records of VAT refunds. Second, the inclusion of “indirect” zero rates in the cal-
culation of the rate gap opens up the possibility for understanding the effects of 
this derogation from the Law on the efficiency of VAT collection. 
Source: Author’s calculation.
Chart 8 
Decomposing changes of VAT revenue in B&H, in % 
With regard to the VAT system with a single rate, decomposition of VAT collection 
in B&H (chart 8) according to Keen’s model (Keen, 2013), shows that VAT col-
lection in B&H is affected by two factors, where changes in the collection effi-
ciency were stronger than changes in consumption (base) in all years except in 
2011. The outbreak of the crisis (2009) brought about a decline in the base and a d
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328 fall in collection efficiency, the fall in efficiency being sharper. In the next two 
years the efficiency growth (2010), and the cumulative effect of the efficiency and 
consumption growth (2011) resulted in a strong increase in the share of VAT in 
GDP. However, the last two years have brought a drop in efficiency (2012) and 
cumulative decline in efficiency and consumption (2013), which resulted in the 
reduction of the share of VAT revenues in GDP. 
The B&H policy in terms of the rules for VAT taxation in international trade of 
B&H has been constant since the introduction of VAT and should not affect sig-
nificantly the VAT collection. However, B&H has not yet harmonized rules of 
taxation of services in international trade with the new rules that are being intro-
duced in the EU in phases during the period 2010-2015. Failure to harmonize 
rules of taxation of services in B&H leads to non-taxation of imports of services 
from the EU in B&H and to double taxation of exports of services from B&H in 
the EU. This harms the competitive position of service companies from B&H on 
both the domestic and the EU market. However, budgets of government levels in 
B&H can also be affected if lost VAT on imported services exceeds VAT collected 
from domestic companies in exports of services which is, in principle, difficult to 
assess. Consequently, the VAT policy gap may increase.
Decomposition of the policy gap (table 12) shows the growing importance of re-
fund payments on the basis of international projects on collection efficiency. Bear-
ing in mind that the scope of exemptions for the use of IPA funds was also ex-
panded in the same period, it can be concluded that the impact of the indirect ap-
plication of a zero VAT rate is still higher compared to the effect of exemptions. 
The negative impact of narrowing the taxable base is partially offset by the effects 
of harmonization of excise duties with EU standards. Net negative effects of poli-
cies of VAT, customs duties and excise taxes are around 0.2% of GDP (table 13). 
table 12 
Summary of net effects of country-specific policy issues on VAT collection
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
As % of net VAT  -1.5 -1.6 -1.4 -1.5 -1.2 -2.2
As % of GDP  -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2
Notes: (a) figures include net effects of exemptions of supplies under IPA funds, zero-rated supplies 
under international projects and involvement in regional and global integrations; (b) negative 
sign reflects a direction of influence on VAT and GDP.
Source: Author’s calculation; VAT revenues: ITA; GDP: Agency for Statistics of B&H (2006-
2012)/Directorate for Economic Planning (estimation for 2013).
7.2.2 Compliance gap
Deterioration of the negative impact, measured by percentage of net VAT, in 2013 
was obviously the result of the erosion of VAT revenues due to the deterioration of 
taxpayers’ tax discipline. The extent of the compliance gap in B&H is below the d
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329 EU average, which amounts to 17% (CASE, 2013). This may be explained by the 
fact that the VAT system in B&H is only in the early stages of implementation, 
compared to the mature VAT system of EU member states, where more extensive 
and complex VAT frauds occur, transcending national boundaries. Analysis of the 
VAT base indicates an increase in the part of the theoretical VAT base on which 
VAT has not been paid. In addition to methodological factors, in terms of the qual-
ity of national account statistics, tax compliance may be affected by changes in 
consumer behavior (for example changes in the amount of consumption or cha-
nges in the structure of consumption), as forms of legal tax avoidance, induced by 
poor tax policy design. An important factor is also the behavior of taxpayers in 
terms of compliance with tax regulations and timely payments of VAT obligations. 
In the initial years of implementation of VAT in B&H, debts were insignificant. 
The growing illiquidity of the economy, as a result of the global economic crisis, 
first manifested through increased VAT refund requests instead of tax credits and 
in the coming years in the growing trend of VAT debt (table 13). 
Dynamic OECD VAT debt ratio in B&H shows a growing trend. Although the 
presented summary of the ratio of tax debt does not allow a direct comparison of 
the VAT debt movement in B&H with other countries, given the dominant impor-
tance of VAT in the tax structure of B&H it can be concluded that the increase in 
VAT debt can be much faster in B&H than in most of EU and OECD member 
states. B&H is an open country. Given that most of B&H gross receipts from VAT 
(about 60%) are collected at the border there is less likelihood of tax evasion than 
in countries that are less open than B&H. On the other hand, a significant share of 
imports in foreign trade in goods increases the possibility of VAT frauds. Given 
that VAT is a dominant source of revenues in B&H, the expansion of the VAT gap, 
due either to a debt increase or to frauds, represents a serious cause of reduced 
VAT efficiency and budgets of all levels of government. 
It can be concluded that current net losses on VAT that can be identified amount to 
4% of net VAT collection or 0.4% of GDP. Those figures include only the losses 
in revenues from VAT as a result of tax concessions (derogations), reforms in ex-
cise and customs policy and losses due to VAT debt that can be identified and 
measured.
table 13 
Trends in VAT debt
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Ratio of aggregate end-year 
VAT arrears
0.6 0.9 1.3 2.7 4.1 6.1 7.9 9.8
Net VAT debt as % of VAT 
collection
0.6 0.4 0.4 1.3 1.5 2.3 1.8 1.8
Net VAT debt as % of GDP 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2
Source: Author’s calculation; VAT revenue and debt: ITA; GDP: Agency for Statistics of B&H 
(2006-2012)/Directorate for Economic Planning (estimation for 2013).d
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330 8   INsTEAD OF CONCLUsION: DIRECTIONs FOR REFORM  
OF THE VAT sYsTEM IN ORDER TO IMpROVE THE EFFICIENCY 
Results of studies and research into the directions of tax system reform in the 
world indicate that the preferable VAT system should preferably be structured 
close to the ideal VAT concept. A system with those features would ensure addi-
tional revenues needed for fiscal consolidation and accelerated growth after the 
global economic crisis, with low tax compliance costs. A VAT system similar to 
the ideal was implemented in B&H in 2006. After the successful implementation 
of VAT, the outbreak of crisis brought a sharp drop in revenues from this tax. The 
recovery that followed was temporary. As early as 2012 despite the growth of the 
economy, revenues from VAT stagnated, and in 2013 a decline of 1.9% was re-
corded. The period of implementation of VAT coincided with the outbreak of the 
global economic crisis and the entry of B&H in the global integration processes. 
B&H has neutralized the negative effects of tariff liberalization on revenues from 
indirect taxes by increasing excise and road taxes as part of the harmonization of 
excise taxes with EU standards and EU tax strategy that focuses on the taxation of 
consumption and green taxes. The process of foreign trade liberalization creates 
continuous pressure on fiscal authorities to compensate for the losses in customs 
duties by increasing excise and VAT collection. Negative trends in excise and VAT 
collection in 2013 suggest that possibilities to compensate for losses of customs 
revenue by continuing the process of excise harmonization with EU standards are 
exhausted. In addition, the complex decentralized fiscal architecture of B&H, with 
tax competences for direct and indirect taxes divided between levels of govern-
ment, prevents at the outset the fiscal devaluation or fiscal revaluation, necessary 
for the compensation of revenues lost in the process of trade liberalization. There-
fore, the process of further liberalization of foreign trade with EU member states, 
which B&H expects in the coming stages of the European integration process, 
largely depends on the efficiency of the tax administration and the control institu-
tions of central and middle levels of government in the fight against frauds in the 
field of VAT and excise taxes, as the main alternative sources of revenues. 
Decomposition of the VAT efficiency ratio in B&H shows considerable scope for 
reducing the VAT gap in the area of regulation compliance. Although VAT has 
been in force for only eight years, the growth of VAT gap shows that the VAT 
system in B&H has evolved from the initial phase, in which sporadic frauds were 
possible, into a more mature phase. The emergence of more complex and serious 
VAT frauds requires an increase in the work efficiency of the ITA. It means an 
application of modern methods and mechanisms to combat frauds at a national 
level. It is also important to strengthen the data exchange with Entity Tax Admin-
istrations and involve B&H in the data exchange platform offered by the EU to 
third countries. Finally, efficient tax collection requires the strengthening of legal 
sanctions and reducing the level of corruption in society. 
Bearing in mind that B&H applies the standard rate and limited scope of exemp-
tions from VAT in accordance with the EU Directive, it can be concluded that d
i
n
k
a
 
a
n
t
i
ć
:
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
c
y
 
o
f
 
a
 
s
i
n
g
l
e
-
r
a
t
e
 
a
n
d
 
b
r
o
a
d
-
b
a
s
e
d
 
v
a
t
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
:
 
t
h
e
 
c
a
s
e
 
o
f
 
b
o
s
n
i
a
 
a
n
d
 
h
e
r
z
e
g
o
v
i
n
a
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
t
h
e
o
r
y
 
a
n
d
 
p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
3
8
 
(
3
)
 
3
0
3
-
3
3
5
 
(
2
0
1
4
)
331 there is little scope for increasing the VAT efficiency in the sphere of VAT policy 
in B&H. Analyses of the VAT efficiency presented in the paper, show a growing 
negative impact of broadening the scope of exemptions on supplies of goods and 
services financed under the EU aid and VAT refunds on the basis of international 
projects on the VAT efficiency. 
Indirect introduction of the zero VAT rate in the country and expanding the scope 
of exemptions, the VAT system in B&H has de facto been degraded into the VAT 
model of the “first generation”, which has, according to numerous studies, proved 
ineffective in the EU and other countries. Further directions of the reform of the 
VAT system in order to increase the efficiency would entail, in the first step, plac-
ing the derogations from the Law under control. Although indirect application of 
the zero rate came out of the assumed international liabilities due to the broad in-
terpretation of the term relief, it was necessary to specify in bylaws the criteria for 
categorization of international projects for the purpose of the right to a refund. 
Also, the future negative impact of exemptions from VAT on VAT frauds and VAT 
collection efficiency should not be underestimated. In the coming years, we ex-
pect a strong growth in financial assistance from the EU for reconstruction and 
infrastructure investments in B&H, an escalation of VAT frauds in the country 
while a further decrease in VAT efficiency can be expected as well. One of the 
options for placing exemptions under control is to redefine the rules of using funds 
under EU projects in such a way as to bring in a right to a refund instead of an 
exemption. B&H needs urgently to harmonize VAT rules of services in B&H with 
the new rules in the EU in order to eliminate double taxation of domestic service 
providers and double non-taxation of taxpayers from the EU. In addition to the 
fact that the above interventions in the Law should increase the efficiency of the 
VAT system in B&H, it would also create the preconditions for B&H to be able to 
keep pace with the process of the VAT system reforms in the EU. It would require 
simplification and modernization of the administration VAT, a narrowing of the 
scope of exemptions of the public sector, financial and postal services. Those pol-
icy and administrative measures should result in revenue growth and VAT collec-
tion efficiency. d
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